Fu-bi Luo
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, 400030, Chongqing, China
Yong Zhu
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, 400030, Chongqing, China
ABSTRACT
Considering that the players of auditing collusion are always bounded rationality, the strategies choice on the interaction between the manager and auditor is studied by using evolutionary game theory. The results show that when the payoff for manager finance information manipulation is lower than the cost, the manager reports the true information; when the payoff for auditing collusion is smaller than the cost, the auditor rejects collusion. When the payoff for auditing collusion is large, also the probability of finding auditor collusion is small and the penalty of auditing collusion is light, then the auditor is more likely to taking collusion action. Monitoring the auditing collusion strictly and punishing auditing collusion heavily can proof auditing collusion.
PDF References Citation
Received: August 02, 2013;
Accepted: October 06, 2013;
Published: November 12, 2013
How to cite this article
Fu-bi Luo and Yong Zhu, 2013. Evolutionary Game Analysis on Auditing Collusion. Journal of Applied Sciences, 13: 4759-4763.
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2013.4759.4763
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=jas.2013.4759.4763
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2013.4759.4763
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=jas.2013.4759.4763
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