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Journal of Applied Sciences

Year: 2013 | Volume: 13 | Issue: 17 | Page No.: 3594-3598
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2013.3594.3598
Research on Risk-averse Suppliers’ Supplying Behavior Based on Consignment Sale Model
Biao Zhang and Di Zhang

Abstract: Owing to the existence of risk-averse suppliers, this research constructed a newsvendor model of supply chain on the basis of consignment sale model. Through theoretical analysis, this research proved the correlation between suppliers’ risk coefficient, the distributional proportion of retailers’ interests and suppliers’ supplies was negative while the correlation between shared coefficient of retailers’ cost and suppliers’ supplies was positive. Finally, the conclusion was proved to be correct through a numerical illustration. The conclusion set a guidance to formulate a effective supplying contract for predominant retailers.

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How to cite this article
Biao Zhang and Di Zhang, 2013. Research on Risk-averse Suppliers’ Supplying Behavior Based on Consignment Sale Model. Journal of Applied Sciences, 13: 3594-3598.

Keywords: Consignment sale model, the newsvendor model, risk-averseness and supply chain

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