Quality Constraint Mechanism of Modular Outsourcing on the Mass Loss
Abstract:
The modular organization is the main organizational model
in the future and modular outsourcing has become a new trend. It discusses two
kinds of commitment means under the symmetry of information condition, the results
cannot achieve the overall and local optimal; and it also analysis three kinds
of commitment ways on mass loss under the asymmetric information condition,
by determining the a reasonable internal and external commitment to quality
loss coefficient, it can make the supervision level of module integrator and
the prevention level of module supplier meet to the Nash equilibrium solution
and the modular organization optimal solution. The results show that: the modular
organization should be borne to establish the appropriate mechanisms to adequate
information-shared, choose the long-term strategic partners and to build collaborative
networks of modular outsourcing strategy in order to reduce the cost of supervision
and constraint and enhance the quality of authority.
How to cite this article
Liangqing Feng, Dali Huang and Chao Xia, 2013. Quality Constraint Mechanism of Modular Outsourcing on the Mass Loss. Information Technology Journal, 12: 5245-5251.
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