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Research Article

Study on Emission Permits Trading Model under the Differentiated Supervision Cost

Zhu Yong and Yufang Gou
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Emission trading mechanism as an important factor to measure the efficiency of regional emission trading market, it related to the rational use of environmental capacity, the rationality of regional industrial development, as well as regional environmental control objectives and so on, the reasonable design of trading mechanism directly determines the regional emission trading practice effect. In this study, on the basis of a reasonable definition of environmental capacity, builds regional emissions trading model and establishes a emission rights trading supervision mechanism led by the government considering the regional economic structure and benefit of each participant body, through the analysis of the emission trading efficiency under different regulatory cost , the paper concludes that the relevant government departments should be play a role in macro-control and market management, encourage enterprises to actively participate in the transaction, to continuously reduce transaction costs and constantly improve the level of emission monitoring and improve the trading punishment system, in order to prevent enterprises in the transaction market fraud and the emergence of monopoly power due to the emission trading.

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  How to cite this article:

Zhu Yong and Yufang Gou , 2013. Study on Emission Permits Trading Model under the Differentiated Supervision Cost. Journal of Applied Sciences, 13: 3089-3093.

DOI: 10.3923/jas.2013.3089.3093


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