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Journal of Applied Sciences
  Year: 2014 | Volume: 14 | Issue: 18 | Page No.: 2079-2083
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2014.2079.2083
 
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Intervention in Coal Mining Safety Production Supervision in China Based on the Principal-agent Model

Chun Yan, Xianghui Chen, Wei Liu and Yuan Tian

Abstract:
This study argues that for importing the economical factor, introducing insurance mechanism into supervision of coal mining safety production can fully arouse enthusiasm of all parties, supervise and urge coal mining enterprise to increase the safety input, lower the probability of safety accidents in advance, after the accident increase the capital source of remedying lose in safety production and provide the more reasonable compensation for injured miners and their family. Game analysis on insurance companies intervention in coal worker safety supervision using the principal-agent model is done and many problems such as supervision dynamics, supervision cost and penalties in condition of information asymmetry is discussed. It is demonstrated in the sight of game theory that the differential rate and floating rate of coal worker safety insurance are necessary.
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How to cite this article:

Chun Yan, Xianghui Chen, Wei Liu and Yuan Tian, 2014. Intervention in Coal Mining Safety Production Supervision in China Based on the Principal-agent Model. Journal of Applied Sciences, 14: 2079-2083.

DOI: 10.3923/jas.2014.2079.2083

URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=jas.2014.2079.2083

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