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Journal of Applied Sciences
  Year: 2012 | Volume: 12 | Issue: 12 | Page No.: 1308-1312
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2012.1308.1312
 
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An Experiment on the Level of Trust in an Expanded Investment Game

M. Grof, L. Lechova, V. Gazda and M. Kubak

Abstract:
The study presented an experimental study of an investment game modification. It introduced a variation based on expanding the traditional two-player structure of one sender and one receiver to a structure comprising of one receiver and multiple senders. Using experimental data, it has been shown that the number of senders in the given game structure has an effect on the level of trust and trustworthiness. The analysis also includes other personality traits that influence trust and trustworthiness.
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How to cite this article:

M. Grof, L. Lechova, V. Gazda and M. Kubak, 2012. An Experiment on the Level of Trust in an Expanded Investment Game. Journal of Applied Sciences, 12: 1308-1312.

DOI: 10.3923/jas.2012.1308.1312

URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=jas.2012.1308.1312

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