Subscribe Now Subscribe Today
Science Alert
Curve Top
Information Technology Journal
  Year: 2014 | Volume: 13 | Issue: 2 | Page No.: 260-268
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2014.260.268
Facebook Twitter Digg Reddit Linkedin StumbleUpon E-mail

A Bilateral Bargaining Scheme under Incomplete Information for Dynamic Spectrum Access

Xiaoyan Yin, Miao Pan and Wei Wei

The beyond 3G or 4G mobile systems are envisioned to be characterized by the pouring of diverse services supported by various RANs (Radio Access Networks) belonging to different operators. In parallel with this, how to utilize efficiently the limited radio spectrum and guarantee the operator’s profits has emerged as a joint economical and technical problem. As a possible solution, in this study, a bilateral bargaining approach is proposed for Dynamic Spectrum Management (DSM) based on bargaining games under incomplete information in microeconomics. In the context of distributed reconfigurable networks controlled by different operators, bilateral bargaining DSM (BBDSM) scheme introduces Trading Agents (TA), trading mechanisms as well as reasonable bargaining strategies to facilitate DSM. Related technologies, bargaining games and proposed algorithm are also described in details. Simulation results show that with imperfect load predicting, BBDSM is effective in improving the utilization of spectrum, expanding the individual operator’s profits.
PDF Fulltext XML References Citation Report Citation
How to cite this article:

Xiaoyan Yin, Miao Pan and Wei Wei, 2014. A Bilateral Bargaining Scheme under Incomplete Information for Dynamic Spectrum Access. Information Technology Journal, 13: 260-268.

DOI: 10.3923/itj.2014.260.268






Curve Bottom