Huanbao Wang
Department of Maths and Physics, Anhui Jianzhu University, Hefei, 230601, Anhui, China
ABSTRACT
In this study we define a trace over their topological spaces in concurrent security protocols. For this reason, we specify a symbolic transition graph with a binary equivalence relation based on the CCS language with value-passing processes which is abbreviated to STGR, to describe concurrent communicating procedures in security protocols, namely a calculus of concurrent communicating processes and structure topological spaces with their message spaces among principals, where the regular participants or penetrators of the security protocol must be distinguished by the trace. A principal in a security protocol creates and transmit a message containing a new value, later receiving it back in a different cryptographic context. It can be concluded that some principal possessing the relevant key has received and transformed the message. The trace on STGR over topological spaces for value-passing processes based on CCS with infinite assignments being different from the original STG is used to follow the track of the regular participants of the security protocol, so it makes a model for proving safety properties of cryptographic protocols that run in an infinite concurrent way.
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How to cite this article
Huanbao Wang, 2013. Traces over Topological Spaces in Concurrent Security Protocols. Information Technology Journal, 12: 4818-4822.
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.4818.4822
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.4818.4822
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.4818.4822
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.4818.4822
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